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Abstract
When individual judgments (‘yes’ or ‘no’) on some propositions are aggregated into
collective judgments, the agenda setter can sometimes reverse a collective judgment
by changing the set of propositions under consideration (the agenda). I deﬁne diﬀer-
ent kinds of agenda manipulation, and axiomatically characterize the aggregation rules
immune to each kind. Two axioms emerge as central for preventing agenda manip-
ulation: the familiar independence axiom, requiring propositionwise aggregation, and
the axiom of implicit consensus preservation, requiring the respect of any (possibly im-
plicit) consensus. I prove that these axioms can almost never be satisﬁed together by a
(non-degenerate) aggregation rule.
1 Introduction
Imagine the board of a central bank has to form collective judgments (‘yes’ or ‘no’)
on some propositions about the economy, such as the proposition that prices will rise.
Disagreements on a proposition are resolved by taking a majority vote. The chair of
the board believes that prices will rise, but knows that the board’s majority thinks
otherwise. To prevent a collective ‘no inﬂation’ judgment, he (or she) removes the
proposition ‘prices will rise’ from the agenda, while putting two new propositions on
the agenda: ‘GDP will grow’, and ‘growth implies inﬂation’, i.e., ‘if GDP will grow, then
prices will rise’. When it comes to voting, the two new propositions are each approved by
a (diﬀerent) majority. The chair is pleased, since the collective beliefs in growth and in
growth implying inﬂation logically entail a belief in inﬂation. The agenda manipulation
Inflation? Growth? Growth implies inflation?
Member 1 Yes Yes Yes
Member 2 No No Yes
Member 3 No Yes No
Majority No Yes Yes
manipulated agendainitial agenda
Figure 1: An agenda manipulation reversing the collective judgment on inﬂation
1CNRS, Paris, France & University of East Anglia, UK. Email: fd@franzdietrich.net. Web:
www.franzdietrich.net.
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has successfully turned an (explicit) ‘no inﬂation’ judgment into an (implicit) ‘inﬂation’
judgment. Table 1 illustrates this reversal in the case of a three-member board.
This example shows that majority voting is vulnerable to agenda manipulation.
Which rules (if any) are immune to agenda manipulation? This paper deﬁnes diﬀer-
ent types of agenda manipulation, and characterizes the aggregation rules immune to
each type. Two axioms on the aggregation rule turn out to play key roles in ensuring
manipulation-immunity: independence (i.e., the analogue for judgment aggregation of
Arrow’s axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives for preference aggregation),
and implicit consensus preservation (i.e., the principle of respecting unanimity, in a
strengthened version extended to implicit judgments). In an impossibility theorem, I
prove that these two axioms can almost never be satisﬁed by an aggregation rule which
is non-dictatorial (as well as having an unrestricted domain and generating rational
collective judgments). This impossibility theorem is also of interest independently of
the question of agenda manipulation, because the two axioms need not be motivated by
considerations of agenda manipulation. The paper therefore has two main contributions:
an analysis of agenda manipulation, and the proof of a new impossibility theorem.
The present analysis of agenda manipulation ﬁlls a gap in the literature on judgment
aggregation, in which agenda manipulation is often mentioned informally, and is treated
in a partially formal way by Dietrich (2006).2 Relatedly, the judgment aggregation
literature has addressed rule manipulation, speciﬁcally manipulation of the order in
which a sequential aggregation rule considers the propositions (List 2004, Dietrich and
List 2007c, Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2013), and strategic voting (Dietrich and List
2007b, Dokow and Falik 2012; see also Nehring and Puppe 2002).
The paper’s second contribution — a new impossibility theorem — connects to a series
of impossibility results in the ﬁeld; see for instance List and Pettit (2002), Pauly and van
Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a), Mongin (2008), Nehring and
Puppe (2008), Duddy and Piggins (2013), and papers in the Symposium on Judgment
Aggregation in Journal of Economic Theory (C. List and B. Polak eds., 2010). Of
particular interest to us is a theorem which generalizes Arrow’s Theorem from preference
to judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List 2007a and Dokow and Holzman 2010, both
building on Nehring and Puppe 2010 and strengthening Wilson 1975). Our new theorem
shows that if in the generalized Arrow theorem the Pareto-type unanimity condition
is extended towards implicit agreements, then, perhaps surprisingly, the dictatorship
conclusion now holds for almost all agendas, not just agendas of a quite special structure.
I ﬁnally mention a growing branch of the literature which constructs concrete judg-
ment aggregation rules, and which I hope to sensitize to the problem of agenda ma-
nipulation. Many proposals have been made. Our analysis will imply that almost all
proposals are vulnerable to agenda manipulation, yet in diﬀerent ways and to diﬀerent
degrees. The proposals include premise- and conclusion-based rules (e.g., Kornhauser
and Sager 1986, List and Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2006), sequential rules (e.g., List 2004,
Dietrich and List 2007b), distance-based rules (e.g., Konieszni and Pino-Perez 2002,
Pigozzi 2006, Miller and Osherson 2008, Eckert and Klamler 2009, Lang et al. 2011,
Duddy and Piggins 2012a), quota rules with well-calibrated acceptance thresholds and
2Dietrich’s (2006) analysis is diﬀerent, and does not model the class of feasible agendas (from which
the agenda setter chooses) and the corresponding class of aggregation rules. Nonetheless, two parallels
in the ﬁndings will emerge, as pointed out below.
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various degrees of collective rationality (e.g., Dietrich and List 2007b; see also Nehring
and Puppe 2010), aggregation rules for restricted domains (Dietrich and List 2010, Pi-
vato 2009), Borda-like and scoring rules (Zwicker 2011, Dietrich forthcoming, Duddy
and Piggins 2012b), and rules which approximate the majority judgment set when it is
inconsistent (Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2013).
2 The framework
I now introduce the framework, following List and Pettit (2002) and more precisely
Dietrich (2007 and forthcoming). A group of n individuals, labelled i = 1, ..., n, needs
to decide which of certain interconnected propositions to collectively ‘believe’ or ‘accept’.
We assume that n ≥ 3.3
The agenda. The set of propositions under consideration — the agenda — is subdivided
into issues, i.e., pairs of a proposition and its negation, such as ‘it will snow’ and ‘it won’t
snow’. Rationally, an agent accepts a proposition from each issue (‘completeness’), and
respects any logical interconnections between propositions (‘consistency’). Writing ‘¬p’
for the negation of a proposition ‘p’, the agenda takes the form X = {p,¬p, q,¬q, ...},
with issues {p,¬p}, {q,¬q}, etc. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1 An agenda is a set X (of ‘propositions’) with a structure of
(a) binary ‘issues’ {p, p′} which partition X (where the members p and p′ of an issue
are the ‘negations’ of each other, written p = ¬p′ and p′ = ¬p),
(b) interconnections, i.e., a speciﬁcation of which judgment sets are rational, or for-
mally, a system J of (‘rational’) judgment sets J ⊆ X, each containing exactly
one member from any issue,
where (in this paper) X is ﬁnite and |J | > 1.4
The propositions could for instance be speciﬁed as sentences of formal logic. Exam-
ples are the agendas
X = {p,¬p, q,¬q}, (1)
X = {p,¬p, q,¬q, p ∧ q,¬(p ∧ q)}, (2)
X = {p,¬p, p→ q,¬(p→ q), q,¬q}, (3)
where p and q are two atomic sentences (such as ‘it will rain’ and ‘it will be hot’, and
p∧q and p→ q are the compound propositions ‘p and q’ and ‘if p then q’. The structure
of any of these agendas — issues and interconnections — is inherited directly from logic
and so need not be speciﬁed explicitly (an advantage of logically speciﬁed agendas). It
is for instance clear that for agenda (1) {p,¬q} is a rational judgment set, while for
agenda (2) {p, q,¬(p ∧ q)} is not rational. For each of these agendas there are exactly
3All results except the ‘only if’ part of Theorem 1 only require that n ≥ 2.
4The ﬁniteness restriction is mainly for convenience; most results do not require it. The condition
that |J | > 1 prevents trivial agendas which oﬀer no choice. Algebraically speaking, the agenda is the
structure X ≡ (X, I,J ) where I is the set of issues (or equivalently, the structure X ≡ (X,¬,J ) where
¬ is the negation operator on X, which is indeed interdeﬁnable with I).
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four rational judgment sets, given by the four possible combinations of truth values of
p and q.
Given an agenda X, an individual’s judgment set is the set J ⊆ X of proposi-
tions he accepts. It is complete if it contains a member of each issue {p,¬p}, and
consistent if it is a subset of a rational judgment set. Note that the complete and
consistent judgment sets are precisely the rational ones: J = {J ⊆ X : J is complete
and consistent}. Typically, every proposition p ∈ X is contingent, i.e., is neither a
contradiction (for which {p} is inconsistent), nor a tautology (for which {¬p} is in-
consistent). A proposition p ∈ X (or set S ⊆ X) entails another proposition p′ ∈ X
(or set S′ ⊆ X) if every evert rational judgment set containing p (resp. including S)
also contains p′ (resp. includes S′).
As an important example, the preference agenda for a (ﬁnite non-empty) set of
alternatives A is the set of sentences X = {xPy : x, y ∈ A,x = y}, where xPy reads ‘x is
better than y’. The negation of xPy is of course ¬xPy = yPx. The interconnections are
given by the usual conditions deﬁning strict linear orders, i.e., transitivity, asymmetry
and connectedness. Formally, note that judgment sets J ⊆ X can be identiﬁed with
(irreﬂexive) binary relations ≻ over A: to any J ⊆ X corresponds the relation ≻
satisfying xPy ∈ J ⇔ x ≻ y. We can thus apply relation-theoretic notions (such as
transitivity) to judgment sets, and write J = {J ⊆ X : J is transitive, asymmetric and
connected}.
Aggregation rules. An aggregation rule for an agenda X is a function F which to
every proﬁle of ‘individual’ judgment sets (J1, ..., Jn) (from some domain, usually J
n)
assigns a ‘collective’ judgment set F (J1, ..., Jn). For instance, majority rule is given by
F (J1, ..., Jn) = {p ∈ X : more than half of J1, ..., Jn contain p}
and generates inconsistent collective judgment sets for many agendas and proﬁles. We
shall be concerned with aggregation rules whose individual inputs and collective output
are rational. These rules deﬁne functions F : J n → J .
Notation. I write JX for J when there is ambiguity as to the agenda X in question.
The negation-closure of a set Y of propositions is denoted Y ± ≡ {p,¬p : p ∈ Y }. A
judgment set is often abbreviated by concatenating its members in any order (e.g., p¬q
is short for {p,¬q}). We can thus concisely write the agenda (1) as X = {p, q}± and
its system of rational judgment sets as J = {pq, p¬q,¬pq,¬p¬q}.
Subagendas and superagendas. We call an agenda X a subagenda of another
X ′ (and X ′ an extension or superagenda of X) if X ⊆ X ′, where the structure
of X — its issues {p,¬p} and its interconnections — is given by that of X ′ restricted
to X, i.e., each issue of X is one of X ′ and the set of rational judgment sets for X
is JX = {J ∩ X : J ∈ JX′}. So, subagendas of an agenda X
′ are subsets X ⊆ X ′
closed under negation, with structure inherited from X ′. For instance, agenda (1) is a
subagenda of agendas (2) and (3), and the preference agenda for a set of a alternatives
A is a subagenda of the preference agenda for any larger set of alternatives A′ ⊇ A.
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3 Two axioms which limit agenda manipulation
I now state two axioms on an aggregation rule F : J n → J for a given agenda X. Each
of them helps to limit agenda manipulation, as formally shown in Section 6.
The ﬁrst axiom is the classical condition of ‘independence’ or ‘propositionwise ag-
gregation’. It requires the collective judgment on any given proposition in the agenda
to depend solely on the individuals’ judgments on this proposition — the exact analogue
for judgment aggregation of Arrow’s axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives
for preference aggregation.5
Independence: For all propositions p ∈ X and proﬁles (J1, ..., Jn), (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∈ J
n,
if, for every individual i, p ∈ Ji ⇔ p ∈ J
′
i , then p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn)⇔ p ∈ F (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n).
This axiom is normatively as controversial as Arrow’s analogous axiom. It is known
to be necessary for preventing strategic voting. We here focus on its role in prevent-
ing agenda manipulation. As shown in Section 6, it is necessary (and under a mild
coherence assumption also suﬃcient) for preventing an agenda manipulator from being
able to reverse explicit collective judgments. In short, if independence is violated, then
the collective judgment on a proposition p ∈ X depends on other propositions in the
agenda, and can thus be reversed by the agenda setter through adding or removing
other propositions.
The second axiom can be stated in three versions. The ﬁrst version draws on the
scope of the agenda X (Dietrich 2006). Informally, the scope is the superagenda con-
taining all propositions that can be constructed from propositions in X using Boolean
connectives, such as the propositions ‘p and q’, ‘not (p and q)’, ‘p or (q and r)’, where
p, q, r ∈ X. In other words, the scope of X is the superagenda containing any proposi-
tion whose truth value is settled by the truth values of the propositions in X. So, any
rational judgment set J ∈ J settles any proposition p in the scope: either J entails p
or J entails ¬p. Since the notion of the scope is intuitively clear, I relegate its formal
deﬁnition to Section 5, and proceed immediately to the statement of the condition.
Implicit consensus preservation (version 1): For every proposition p in the scope
of the agenda X, if each judgment set in a proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n entails p, so does
the collective judgment set F (J1, ..., Jn).
Normatively, this axiom embodies a strong form of ‘respect for unanimity’, as it
also covers implicit unanimous agreements, which pertain to propositions outside the
agenda. In Section 6 I give two formal arguments for the axiom, both related to the pre-
vention of agenda manipulation. Let me here sketch each argument informally. Firstly,
the axiom is invariant to redescribing (‘reframing’) the decision problem: the set of
propositions p on which consensus must be preserved stays the same if the agenda X
is replaced by a new one X ′ which has the same scope and is thereby equivalent — for
instance by replacing two propositions p and q in X (and their negations) by the four
propositions p ∧ q, p ∧ ¬q, ¬p ∧ q and ¬p ∧ ¬q (and their negations).6 Secondly, the
5Arrow’s axiom is equivalent to ours applied to the preference agenda (deﬁned in Section 2).
6 I thank Marcus Pivato for bringing this fact to my attention.
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axiom prevents a particularly bad form of agenda manipulation, in which unanimously
supported collective judgments are being reversed.
A second and equivalent version of the axiom draws on the notion of a feature of a
judgment set. Examples are the feature of containing a given proposition p ∈ X, and
the feature of containing at most two propositions from a given set S ⊆ X. We may
identify each feature with the set K ⊆ J of judgment sets having the feature. In its
second version, our axiom requires the collective judgment set to have any feature which
all individual judgment sets have:
Implicit consensus preservation (version 2): For every K ⊆ J (every feature), if
each judgment set in a proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n belongs to K (has the feature), so does
the collective judgment set F (J1, ..., Jn).
Intuitively, the versions 1 and 2 are equivalent because features correspond to propo-
sitions in the scope: for instance, the feature of containing two given propositions q and
r from X corresponds to the proposition ‘q and r’ from the scope. In its third version,
the axiom requires the collective judgment set to be selected from the set of individual
judgment sets:
Implicit consensus preservation (version 3): For every proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J n,
the collective judgment set F (J1, ..., Jn) belongs to {J1, ..., Jn}.
This condition has no ‘dictatorship ﬂavour’ since the individual whose judgment set
becomes the collective one may of course vary with the proﬁle: he could for instance be
the ‘median’ voter in a suitably deﬁned sense.
Proposition 1 The three versions of implicit consensus preservation are equivalent.
4 The impossibility theorem
I now combine the two just-deﬁned axioms into an impossibility result. An aggregation
rule F : J n → J is dictatorial if there is an individual i such that F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji
for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ J . As usual in the theory, the structure of the agenda matters.
The agenda X is called nested if it takes the very special form X = {p1, p2, ..., pm}
±
where m is the number of issues and where p1 entails p2, p2 entails p3, and so on (it
follows that ¬pm entails ¬pm−1, ¬pm−1 entails ¬pm−2, and so on). For instance, in
a central bank meeting, the agenda X = {p1, ..., p10}± in which pj is the proposition
‘prices will grow by j percent at most’ is nested, as pj entails pj+1 for each j (< 10).
Similarly, in a hiring committee meeting, the agenda X = {p1, ..., p5}
± in which pj is
the proposition ‘candidate Smith will publish fewer than j papers per year’ is nested.
But most relevant agendas are not nested. The agendas (1), (2) and (3) are not nested,
and also the preference agenda deﬁned in Section 2 is not nested (as long as there are
more than two alternatives).
Theorem 1 There is no independent, implicit consensus preserving and non-dictatorial
aggregation rule F : J n → J if and only if the agenda X is non-nested (and non-tiny7).
7That is, X has more than four propositions (two issues). To be precise, X is non-tiny if it
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To paraphrase the result, for almost all agendas our two axioms cannot be jointly
satisﬁed by any non-dictatorial aggregation rule. So, far more agendas imply impos-
sibility than in the generalized Arrow theorem mentioned in the introduction — as a
consequence of requiring preservation of implicit consensus instead of the standard
Pareto-type unanimity condition. Judgment aggregation theorists will be curious to
know whether the notion of a non-nested agenda is related to a familiar kind of agenda.
Non-nested agendas can be related to non-simple agendas.8
5 The scope of an agenda
To prepare the treatment of agenda manipulation, I now analyse the scope of an agenda.
In principle, one may imagine two — as we shall see, equivalent — approaches to deﬁning
the scope of an agenda X, which can be stated informally as follows:
(a) the scope consists of all propositions constructible from propositions in X (by
forming conjunctions for instance);
(b) the scope consists of all propositions on which the judgment (‘yes’ or ‘no’) is
determined by the judgments on the propositions in X.
I choose the approach (a), but also brieﬂy discuss the approach (b) (which is perhaps
more in line with Dietrich’s 2006 deﬁnition9). Starting with some natural terminology,
I call an agenda
• closed under conjunction if for any propositions p, q ∈ X there exists a propo-
sition r (the conjunction of p and q) such that any rational judgment set contains
r if and only if it contains both p and q,
• closed under disjunction if for any propositions p, q ∈ X there exists a propo-
sition r (the disjunction of p and q) such that any rational judgment set contains
r if and only if it contains p or q (possibly both).
These two closure properties are in fact equivalent, as is seen shortly. In practice,
an agenda is speciﬁed so as to be redundancy-free: no two propositions p and q are
equivalent, i.e., entail each other.
Remark 1 In any (redundancy-free) agenda X, the conjunction resp. disjunction of
two propositions p and q, if existing, is unique and denoted by p ∧ q resp. p ∨ q.
has more than four propositions (two issues), counting only contingent propositions and identifying
equivalent propositions. In practice, agendas of course contain only contingent propositions and no
equivalent propositions. (Propositions are equivalent if they entail each other.)
8An agenda X is non-simple if it has a subset Y of more than two elements which is minimal
inconsistent, i.e., is inconsistent but becomes consistent if any member is removed. For instance, the
preference agenda for a set of more than two alternatives (Section 2) is non-simple, since any ‘cyclical’
subset Y = {xPy, yPz, zPx} is minimal inconsistent. I show in the appendix that a (non-tiny) agenda
X is non-nested if and only if it satisﬁes a condition only subtly distinct from the deﬁnition of non-
simplicity: X has a subset Y of more than two elements such that (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p} is consistent for
each p ∈ Y . Strengthening ‘a subset Y ’ to ‘an inconsistent subset Y ’ turns this characterization of non-
nestedness into one of non-simplicity. This gives an idea of how non-nestedness weakens non-simplicity.
9 In Dietrich’s (2006) framework, deﬁning the scope was a trivial exercise. That framework explicitly
includes the language in which propositions are formed, so that the propositions in the scope already
‘exist’ and thus need not be newly introduced through an agenda extension.
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Remark 2 An agenda X is closed under conjunction if and only if it is closed under
disjunction. I then call it closed simpliciter.
To form the scope of an agenda, we simply ‘close’ the agenda. The following result
ensures that this is always possible, in a unique way:
Proposition 2 Every agenda X has a closure, i.e., a minimal closed superagenda,
which is moreover unique (up to relabelling10).
Deﬁnition 2 The scope of an agenda X is its (up to relabelling uniquely existing)
minimal closed superagenda, denoted X.
The following lemma gives a clear idea of the totality of propositions in the scope.
It uses conjunctions/disjunctions of any number of propositions, which are deﬁned like
conjunctions/disjunctions of two propositions.11
Lemma 1 Every proposition p in the scope of a (redundancy-free) agenda X can be
written in disjunctive normal form, i.e., as a disjunction of conjunctions of propositions
in X; for instance, p = ∨J∈J p ∧q∈J q, where J
p := {J ∈ JX : J entails p}.
I now show that any agenda X settles its scope: the judgments within X determine
those within the entire scope X. Formally, an agenda X is said to settle a superagenda
X ′ if each rational judgment set J ∈ JX has only one extension J
′ ∈ JX′ .
Proposition 3 Every agenda settles its scope.
In fact, a stronger result can be shown: the scope of an agenda X is the (up to
relabelling unique) maximal superagenda which is settled by X (and is redundancy-free
outside X, i.e., contains no two equivalent propositions outside X). We could therefore
have used an alternative and equivalent deﬁnition of the scope:
Deﬁnition 3 The scope of an agenda X is the (up to relabelling uniquely existing)
maximal superagenda settled by X (and redundancy-free outside X).
Finally, the scope carries a familiar algebraic structure:
Remark 3 Any closed (redundancy-free) agenda — for instance the scope of an agenda —
is a Boolean algebra w.r.t. the relation of entailment between propositions, with the meet,
join, and complement given by the conjunction, disjunction, and negation, respectively.12
10Uniqueness up to relabelling means that between any two minimal closed superagendas X′ and
X′′ there exists an (agenda) isomorphism which is constant on X. Of course, f : X′ → X ′′ is an
isomorphism if it is bijective and preserves the agenda structure, i.e., the issues (f(¬p) = ¬f(p) for all
p ∈ X) and the interconnections (J ∈ JX ⇔ f(J) ∈ JX′ for all J ⊆ X).
11Generalizing the earlier deﬁnition, I call a proposition r the conjunction (resp. disjunction) of a
set of propositions S if any rational judgment set contains r if and only if it contains all (resp. some)
p ∈ S.
12Without assuming redundancy-freeness, the agenda is a Boolean algebra modulo equivalence be-
tween propositions.
8
Recall that Boolean algebras are deﬁned as follows. First, a lattice is a partially
ordered set L ≡ (L,≤) such that any two elements p, q ∈ L have a meet p ∧ q (greatest
lower bound) and a join p∨ q (smallest upper bound). It is distributive if p∨ (q∧ r) =
(p∨ q)∧ (p∨ r) and p∧ (q∨ r) = (p∧ q)∨ (p∧ r) for all p, q, r ∈ L. A Boolean algebra
is a distributive lattice (L,≤) such that L contains a greatest element ⊺ (the ‘top’ or
‘tautology’) and a bottom ⊥ (the ‘bottom’ or ‘contradiction’), and every element has an
algebraic complement, i.e., an element whose join with p is ⊺ and whose meet with p is ⊥.
The paradigmatic Boolean algebras are the set-theoretic ones: here there exists a set Ω
such that L ⊆ 2Ω, ≤ = ⊆, ⊺ = Ω, ⊥ = ∅, and the meet, join and complement are given
by the set-theoretic intersection, union and complement. By Stone’s representation
theorem, every Boolean algebra is isomorphic to such a set-theoretic one. Another
example is the Boolean algebra generated from a logic, i.e., the set of sentences modulo
logical equivalence (where the logic includes classical negation and conjunction, which
induce the algebraic negation, meet and join).
6 Agenda manipulation
I now introduce and analyse diﬀerent forms of (immunity to) agenda manipulation. As a
by-product, the analysis shows that our two axioms — independence and implicit consen-
sus preservation — each play a role in preventing agenda manipulation (so that Theorem
1 can be viewed as an impossibility result about preventing agenda manipulation).
In constructing an agenda, the agenda setter uses propositions from some ‘universal’
set of propositions: an agenda L, which we take to be closed and redundancy-free. L
could be as large as an entire language, or as small as a set of propositions on a relevant
topic (such as a given court trial). The agenda setter thus chooses a (sub)agendaX ⊆ L.
we do not need to assume that all agendas X ⊆ L can be chosen. Rather, we consider
a set X of agendas X ⊆ L deemed feasible/possible. X could for instance contain all
agendas X ⊆ L, or just all agendas X ⊆ L of size at most 6. All we assume is that
X contains at least each binary agenda {p,¬p} ⊆ L. Since L is closed, the scope X
of an agenda X ∈ X is again a subagenda of L, namely the smallest closed one that
includes X13 — though quite possibly X ∈ X since X might be very rich and therefore
infeasible.14
Two agendas X,X ′ ∈ X are equivalent if they have identical scope X = X ′, i.e.,
essentially represent the same decision problem, though framed diﬀerently. Given two
equivalent agendas X,X ′ ∈ X , each judgment set for X is equivalent to one for X ′,
and each aggregation rule for X is equivalent to one for X ′. Formally, any J ∈ JX
is equivalent to the unique J∗ ∈ JX′ such that J and J
∗ entail each other; and any
aggregation rule F : J nX → JX is equivalent to the unique rule F
′ : J nX′ → JX′ deﬁned
as the image of F if any judgment set J ∈ JX is mapped to the equivalent one J
∗ ∈ JX′ ,
i.e.,
[F (J1, ..., Jn)]
∗ = F ′(J∗1 , ..., J
∗
n) for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX .
One may argue that an axiom imposed on aggregation should ideally be description-
invariant: that is, whenever two agendas X,X ′ ∈ X are equivalent (i.e., X = X ′),
13Or so we may assume by suitably labelling the propositions in the scope.
14All results of this section remain true if we allow L and any X ∈ X to be inﬁnite, i.e., to be agendas
in a generalized sense without ﬁniteness restriction.
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then an aggregation rule F : J nX → JX satisﬁes the axiom if and only if the equivalent
rule F ′ : J nX′ → JX ′ does so.
15 One of our two axioms does indeed have this virtue:
Proposition 4 Implicit consensus preservation is a description-invariant axiom.
Description-invariance is a rare feature: it is violated by the independence axiom,
and by the standard consensus axiom, which quantiﬁes over agenda propositions rather
than scope propositions. So, from the perspective of description-invariance, implicit
consensus preservation is more natural than the standard consensus axiom. Two other
description-invariant axioms are the anonymity axiom and the strengthened indepen-
dence axiom used in Theorem 3 and Proposition 5 below.
We now turn to a diﬀerent question: is the aggregation rule itself (rather than an
axiom on it) sensitive to the agenda choice? That is, can the agenda setter reverse
collective judgments by changing the agenda? In analysing this question, we consider
not just agenda modiﬁcations which merely redescribe (reframe) the decision problem,
but also ones which change the scope. The agenda setter could thus pick any agenda
from X . The question of whether the agenda setter can inﬂuence collective judgments
obviously depends on which aggregation rules would be used for the various feasible
agendas. That is, it depends on what I call the aggregation system, i.e., a family
(FX)X∈X of aggregation rules FX : J
n
X → JX (where FX represents the rule used if the
agenda is X ∈ X ).16
I now introduce three conditions on the aggregation system, each one requiring
immunity to agenda manipulation of a particular kind. The ﬁrst condition states that
the agenda setter cannot reverse any explicit collective judgment, i.e., any collective
judgment on a proposition in the agenda:
Agenda-invariance: Any two feasible agendas X,X ′ ∈ X lead to the same collective
judgment on any proposition p ∈ X ∩X ′, i.e., for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX∪X′ ,
p ∈ FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X)⇔ p ∈ FX′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′).
Here, Ji ∩X and Ji ∩X ′ are the judgment sets submitted by individual i under the
agendas X and X ′, respectively. By the next theorem, agenda-invariance forces each
rule FX to be independent. It also forces the rules FX to be related to each other in a
systematic way — intuitively because otherwise collective judgments are easily reversed
by changing the agenda. Formally, the aggregation system (FX)X∈X must be coherent:
for all feasible agendas X,X ′ ∈ X with X ⊆ X ′, the rule FX coheres with FX′ , i.e.,
any J1, ..., Jn in JX have at least some extensions J
′
1 ⊇ J1, ..., J
′
n ⊇ Jn in JX′ such that
FX ′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ⊇ FX(J1, ..., Jn). Coherence means that if the agenda is extended from
X to X ′, then the new collective outcome can be compatible with the old outcome, i.e.,
is compatible with that outcome for at least one possible new proﬁle. Coherence strikes
as plausible.
15To be entirely precise, one can identify an axiom with the set of all aggregation rules satisfying it,
i.e., the set A = {F : F is an aggregation rule J nX → JX for some agenda X ∈ X and F satisﬁes the
axiom}. An axiom is then simply a set A ⊆ ∪X∈X (JX)
J
n
X . It is called description-invariant if for all
equivalent aggregation rules F,F ′ ∈ ∪X∈X (JX)
J
n
X , F ∈ A ⇔ F ′ ∈ A.
16An aggregation system could be viewed as a single ‘extended aggregation rule’ with an additional
parameter, the agenda.
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Theorem 2 An aggregation system (FX)X∈X is agenda-invariant if and only if it is
coherent and each rule FX is independent.
Context-invariance only prevents the agenda setter from reversing explicit collective
judgments, on proposition in the agenda. We now turn to a stronger requirement, which
also excludes the reversal of implicit collective judgments, on propositions outside the
agenda. For instance, if the agenda X = {p,¬p, q,¬q} leads the collective judgment set
{p,¬q}, so that the collective implicitly accepts the proposition p ∧ ¬q in the scope X,
then according to the new condition the acceptance of p ∧ ¬q cannot be reversed by
using another agenda X ′.
Full agenda-invariance: Any two feasible agendas X,X ′ ∈ X lead to the same col-
lective judgment on any proposition p ∈ X ∩X ′, i.e., for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX∪X′ ,
FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p⇔ FX′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′) entails p.
Here, Ji∩X (resp. Ji∩X ′) is again the judgment set submitted by i under the agenda
X (resp. X ′). While ordinary agenda-invariance leads to independence and coherence,
full agenda-invariance leads to stronger versions of independence and coherence. How
are these versions deﬁned? First, an aggregation rule F for an agenda X is called
independent on Y (⊆ X) if the collective judgment on any proposition in Y only
depends on the individuals’ judgments on this proposition: for all propositions p ∈ Y
and all proﬁles (J1, ..., Jn) and (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) in the domain, if for each individual i Ji
entails p if and only if J ′i entails p, then F (J1, ..., Jn) entails p if and only if, F (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n)
entails p. Setting Y = X yields standard independence. Full agenda-invariance leads
to independence on the full scope X rather than on X.
Second, I strengthen the coherence notion. Note that, for agendas X,X ′ ∈ X such
that X ⊆ X ′, or more generally X ⊆ X ′, every judgment set J ′ ∈ JX′ entails exactly
one judgment set J ∈ JX . I call an aggregation system (FX)X∈X fully coherent if,
for all feasible agendas X,X ′ ∈ X with X ⊆ X ′, the rule FX coheres with FX′ , i.e., for
any J1, ..., Jn in JX there exist at least some J
′
1, ..., J
′
n in JX′ such that each J
′
i entails
Ji and FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails FX(J1, ..., Jn). Full coherence strengthens coherence in
a natural way, namely by requiring FX′ to cohere with FX not just when X ⊆ X
′,
but more generally when X ⊆ X ′, i.e., when X ′ is essentially an extension of X. Full
coherence says that if an agenda X is essentially extended to another X ′, then the new
outcome can be compatible with the old one, i.e., is compatible with it for at least one
possible new proﬁle. Full coherence is equivalent to ordinary coherence if the scope of
any feasible agenda is a feasible agenda, i.e., X ∈ X ⇒ X ∈ X .
Theorem 3 An aggregation system (FX)X∈X is fully agenda-invariant if and only if it
is fully coherent and each rule FX is independent on the entire scope X.
One may regard Theorems 2 and 3 as formal counterparts of claims in Dietrich
(2006) about the role of independence and independence on the scope in preventing
agenda manipulation, although Dietrich (2006) does not yet invoke feasible agendas,
aggregation systems, and coherence or full coherence. Unfortunately, Dietrich (2006)
shows that independence on the scope is not satisﬁed by any non-degenerate aggregation
rule, provided the agenda is not trivially small:
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Proposition 5 (Dietrich 2006) For any agenda X with |J | > 2, only dictatorial or
constant aggregation rules F : J n → J are independent on the entire scope X.
Combining Theorem 3 with Proposition 5, I prove in the appendix that only degen-
erate aggregation systems are fully agenda-invariant:
Proposition 6 If an aggregation system (FX)X∈X is fully agenda-invariant, then each
rule FX with |JX | > 2, or more generally with X ⊆ ∪Z∈X :|JZ |>2Z, is dictatorial or
constant.
It is thus necessary in practice to weaken the requirement of full agenda-invariance.
One option is to revert to ordinary agenda-invariance. Another natural option goes
as follows. Rather than requiring that all collective judgments are irreversible (by a
change of agenda), let us merely require that the most important ones are irreversible,
where a collective judgment counts as ‘most important’ if it is unanimously supported by
the individuals. Indeed, reversing a unanimously supported collective judgment seems
particularly bad, as it goes against (‘displeases’) all individuals. The condition that
unanimously supported collective judgments cannot be reversed by agenda manipulation
formally states as follows:
Conditional agenda-invariance: Any two feasible agendas X,X ′ ∈ X lead to the
same collective judgment on any unanimously accepted proposition in X ∩X ′, i.e., for
all J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX∪X′ and all propositions p ∈ X ∩X ′ entailed by each Ji,
17
FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p⇔ FX′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′) entails p.
I now show that, as long as the aggregation system is non-degenerate, the last condi-
tion is equivalent to the requirement that each rule FX is implicit consensus preserving.
By ‘non-degenerate’ I mean that each rule FX is setwise unanimity-preserving, i.e.,
FX(J, ..., J) = J for each set J ∈ JX — a condition to be distinguished from the more
demanding propositionwise unanimity condition.18
Theorem 4 An aggregation system (FX)X∈X (whose rules FX are setwise unanimity-
preserving) is conditionally agenda-invariant if and only if each rule FX is implicit
consensus preserving.
This result adds a second argument for implicit consensus preservation, besides the
argument based on description-invariance (Proposition 4).
17Note that Ji entails p if and only if Ji ∩X entails p (since p ∈ X), and if and only if Ji ∩X
′ entails
p (since p ∈ X′). So, the requirement that each Ji entails p means that p emerges as unanimously
accepted, whether agenda X or agenda X′ is used.
18The propositionwise condition states that every proposition contained in all individual judgment
sets must (regardless of any disagreements on other propositions) belong to the collective judgment
set. While all non-degenerate rules are setwise unanimity-preserving, not all satisfy the propositionwise
condition, as is clear from premise-based, distance-based, and scoring rules.
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A Proofs
The set of individuals is denoted N := {1, ..., n}. Recall that for an agenda X the set
of rational judgment sets is denoted ‘J ’ or sometimes, to avoid ambiguity, ‘JX ’.
A.1 Results of Sections 3 and 4: the impossibility
Proof of Proposition 1. For the agenda X, consider an aggregation rule F : J n → J .
I write ICP1, ICP2 and ICP3 for the three versions of implicit consensus preservation,
respectively.
‘ICP1 ⇒ ICP3 ’: Assume ICP1. Consider any (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n. In the scope we
can form the proposition p := (∧q∈J1q) ∨ · · · ∨ (∧q∈Jnq) (i.e., the proposition that all q
in J1 or all q in J2 ... or all q in Jn hold). Each Ji entails (∧q∈Jiq), and hence, entails
p. So, F (J1, ..., Jn) entails p by ICP1. Let J be the unique extension of F (J1, ..., Jn) to
a set in JX . Since F (J1, ..., Jn) entails p, J contains p. So, for some i, ∧q∈Jiq ∈ J , and
thus Ji ⊆ J . It follows that Ji = J ∩X = F (J1, ..., Jn). QED
‘ICP3 ⇒ ICP2 ’: Assume ICP3 and consider a feature K ⊆ J and a proﬁle
(J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n such that J1, ..., Jn ∈ K. By ICP3, F (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ {J1, ..., Jn}. So,
F (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ K. QED
‘ICP2 ⇒ ICP1 ’: Assume ICP2. Consider any p ∈ X and any proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) ∈
J n such that each Ji entails p. Since each Ji belongs to the feature K := {J ∈ J : J
entails p}, so does F (J1, ..., Jn) by ICP2. 
As part of the proof of Theorem 1, I show several lemmas. For an agenda X, an
aggregation rule F on J n is called systematic if there exists a set W of (‘winning’)
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coalitions C ⊆ N such that
F (J1, ..., Jn) = {p ∈ X : {i : p ∈ Ji} ∈ W} for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ J .
In this case, the set W is uniquely determined and denoted by WF .
Lemma 2 If and only if the agenda X is non-nested, every independent and implicit
consensus preserving aggregation rule F : J n → J is systematic.
Proof. Let X be an agenda. We may assume without loss of generality that all
p ∈ X are contingent, because each side of the claimed equivalence remains true (or
false) if the non-contingent propositions are removed from the agenda.
1. In this part we assume that X is non-nested and consider an independent and
implicit consensus preserving rule F : J n → J . I show that F is systematic (drawing
on Dietrich and List 2013). For any p, q ∈ X, I deﬁne p ∼ q to mean that there exists a
ﬁnite sequence p1, ..., pk ∈ X with p1 = p and pk = q such that any neighbours pl, pl+1
are not exclusive (i.e., {pl, pl+1} is consistent) and not exhaustive (i.e., {¬pl,¬pl+1} is
consistent). I prove ﬁve claims: the ﬁrst four gradually establish that p ∼ q for all
p, q ∈ X, and the last shows that F is systematic.
Claim 1 : For all p, q ∈ X, p ∼ q ⇔ ¬p ∼ ¬q.
It suﬃces to show one direction of implication, as ¬¬p = p for all p ∈ X. Let
p, q ∈ X with p ∼ q. Then there is a path p1, ..., pk ∈ X between p to q where any
neighbours pj, qj+1 are non-exclusive and non-exhaustive. To see why ¬p ∼ ¬q, note
that ¬p1, ...,¬pk is a path between ¬p and ¬q where any neighbours ¬pj ,¬pj+1 are
non-exclusive (as pj , pj+1 are non-exhaustive) and non-exhaustive (as pj, pj+1 are non-
exclusive). QED
Claim 2 : If p ∈ X entails q ∈ X, then p ∼ q.
If p ∈ X entails q ∈ X, then p ∼ q in virtue of a direct connection: p, q are
neither exclusive nor exhaustive (for instance, {p, q} is consistent because p is not a
contradiction and entails q. QED
Claim 3 : ∼ is an equivalence relation on X, and for all p, q ∈ X, p ∼ q or p ∼ ¬q.
(So each equivalence class contains at least one member of each issue {q,¬q}.)
Reﬂexivity, symmetry and transitivity are all obvious (where reﬂexivity uses that
every p ∈ X is contingent). Now consider p, q ∈ X such that p ∼ q; we have to show
that p ∼ ¬q. Since p ∼ q, {p, q} or {¬p,¬q} is inconsistent. In either case, one of p and
¬q entails the other, so that p ∼ ¬q by Claim 2. QED
Claim 4 : p ∼ q for all p, q ∈ X.
Let X+ be an equivalence class w.r.t. ∼ and suppose for a contradiction that X+ =
X. Then, by Claim 3, X+ must contain exactly one member of each issue {r,¬r}.
We show that X+ is weakly ordered by the entailment relation between propositions —
implying thatX is nested, a contradiction. As the entailment relation onX+ is of course
transitive, it remains to show that it is complete on X+. So we consider p, q ∈ X+, and
have to show that p entails q or q entails p. We have p ∼ ¬q, since otherwise X+ would
include the entire issue {q,¬q}. So {p,¬q} or {¬p, q} is inconsistent. Hence, p entails q
or q entails p. QED
Claim 5 : F is systematic.
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Since F is independent, there exists a family (Wp)p∈X of sets of coalitions such that
F (J1, ..., Jn) = {p ∈ X : {i : p ∈ Ji} ∈ Wp} for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ J . (4)
It suﬃces to show that Wp is the same for all p ∈ X. By Claim 4 and the deﬁnition
of ∼, it suﬃces to show that Wp = Wq for all p, q ∈ X which are non-exclusive and
non-exhaustive. Consider such p, q ∈ X. Consider any C ⊆ N and let us show that
C ∈ Wq ⇔ C ∈ Wq. As {p, q} and {¬p,¬q} are consistent, there exist J1, ..., Jn ∈ J
such that p, q ∈ Ji for all i ∈ C and ¬p,¬q ∈ Ji for all i ∈ N\C. We now apply implicit
consensus preservation, in any of its three variants. Using either variant 1 (and the fact
that each Ji entails the proposition (p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬q) in the scope), or variant 2 (and
the fact that each Ji belongs to the feature K := {J ∈ J : p ∈ J ⇔ q ∈ J}), or variant
3, it follows that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) ⇔ q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn). By (4), the left side of this
equivalence holds if and only if C ∈ Wp and the right side holds if and only if C ∈ Wq.
So C ∈ Wp ⇔ C ∈ Wq. QED
2. Now assume that X is nested, i.e., of the form X = {p1, ..., pm}± where m is the
number of issues and where p1 entails p2, p2 entails p3, etc. I consider the aggregation
rule F on J n deﬁned as follows: for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ J , F (J1, ..., Jn) consists of each pj
contained in all Ji and each ¬pj contained in some Ji. We have to show that F (i)
maps into J , (ii) is independent, (iii) is implicit consensus preserving, and (iv) is not
systematic. The properties (ii) and (iv) are obvious (where (iv) uses that n > 1 and that
X contains a pair of contingent propositions p,¬p because |J | > 1). It remains to prove
(i) and (iii). Now (i) follows from (iii) by version 3 of implicit consensus preservation.
To see why (iii) holds, note that for each J ∈ J there is a cut-oﬀ level t ∈ {1, ...,m+1}
such that J = {¬p1, ...,¬pt−1, pt, ..., pm}, and that therefore for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ J we
have F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji where i is the (or an) individual with highest cut-oﬀ level. 
The next lemma is the main technical step towards Theorem 1 and provides two
alternative characterizations of non-nested agendas. (Compare the characterization in
(b) with the deﬁnition of non-simple agendas mentioned in Section 4: the only diﬀerence
is that (b) allows Y to be consistent.)
Lemma 3 For any agenda X, the following are equivalent:
(a) X is non-nested (and non-tiny).
(b) X has a subset Y such that |Y | ≥ 3 and (Y \{p})∪{¬p} is consistent for all p ∈ Y .
(c) X has a subset Y such that |Y | = 3 and (Y \{p})∪{¬p} is consistent for all p ∈ Y .
Proof. Let X be an agenda. I write p ⊢ q to mean that p (∈ X) entails q (∈ X),
and S ⊢ q to mean that S (⊆ X) entails q. We may assume without loss of generality.
that X contains only contingent propositions, and is redundancy-free, i.e., contains no
two equivalent propositions. The reason is that otherwise it suﬃces to do the proof for
any redundancy-free subagenda containing only contingent propositions, because each
of the conditions (a), (b) and (c) holds for X if and only if it holds for that subagenda;
to see for instance why (b) holds for X if and only if it holds for the subagenda, note
that (Y \{p})∪{¬p} can only be consistent for all p ∈ Y if Y contains no two equivalent
propositions and no non-contingent propositions.
The equivalence between (b) and (c) is straightforward (to see why (b) implies (c),
simply replace the set Y in (b) by a three-member subset of it). It is also relatively
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easy to see why (c) implies (a). Indeed, whenever (a) is violated, so is (c), by the
following argument. First, if X is tiny, then (c) is violated since every three-element
set Y ⊆ X takes the form Y = {q,¬q, p} for some p, q ∈ X, and thus Y \{p} ∪ {¬p}
fails to be consistent. Second, if X is nested, say X = {r,¬r : r ∈ Z} for some subset
Z ⊆ X linearly ordered by entailment, condition (c) is violated since any three-element
set Y ⊆ X has elements p = q which both belong to Z or both belong to {¬p : p ∈ Z},
so that (by the linear orderedness of Z and of {¬r : r ∈ Z} w.r.t. entailment) p ⊢ q or
q ⊢ p, which implies that (Y \{q}) ∪ {¬q} or (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent.
It remains to show that (a) implies (c). Let X be non-nested and non-tiny; we show
(c). We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 : no p, q ∈ X are logically independent, i.e., for no p, q ∈ X each of the sets
{p, q}, {p,¬q}, {¬p, q} and {¬p,¬q} is consistent.
Claim 1.1. There exists a (with respect to set-inclusion) maximal nested (sub)agenda
X∗ ⊆ X.
This follows from the fact that the set of nested subagendas V ⊆ X is non-empty
(because it contains any one-issue subagenda {p,¬p}) and ﬁnite (because X is ﬁnite).
QED
Since X∗ is nested, we may write it as X∗ = {p,¬p : p ∈ X∗+} where X
∗
+ is a subset
of X∗ which contains exactly one member of each issue {p,¬p} ⊆ X∗ and is linearly
ordered w.r.t. set-inclusion.
Claim 1.2. There exists an s ∈ X\X∗ such that {s, p} is consistent for all p ∈ X∗+.
Since X∗ is nested but X is not, we have X∗  X, and thus there are r,¬r ∈ X\X∗.
It suﬃces to show that at least one of r and ¬r is consistent with each p ∈ X∗+. This
is true because otherwise there would exist p, p′ ∈ X∗+ such that {r, p} and {¬r, p
′}
are inconsistent, which (recalling that p ⊢ p′ or p′ ⊢ p, and writing p′′ for the logically
stronger one of p and p′) implies that {r, p′′} and {¬r, p′′} are inconsistent, so that {p′′}
is inconsistent, a contradiction since p′′ is contingent. QED
I deﬁne
Y1 : = {p ∈ X
∗
+ : p ⊢ s},
Y2 : = {p ∈ X
∗
+ : ¬p ⊢ s}.
Claim 1.3. Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅, and Y1 ∪ Y2 = X
∗
+.
First, Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅, because otherwise there would be a p ∈ X∗+ such that p ⊢ s
and ¬p ⊢ s, a contradiction as s is not a tautology. Second, suppose for a contradiction
that p ∈ X∗+\(Y1 ∪ Y2). I ultimately show that the agenda X
∗ ∪ {s,¬s} is nested, a
contradiction as X∗ is a maximal nested subagenda of X.
Since p and s are not logically independent (by assumption of Case 1), and since
{p, s} is consistent (by Claim 1.2), {p,¬s} is consistent (as p ∈ Y1) and {¬p,¬s} is
consistent (as p ∈ Y2), it follows that {¬p, s} is inconsistent, so that s ⊢ p. We next
show that s entails not just in p, but also all other propositions in X∗+\Y1:
s ⊢ p′ for all p′ ∈ X∗+\Y1. (5)
To show this, let p′ ∈ X∗+\Y1, and note ﬁrst that ¬p
′ and ¬s are entailed by {¬p′,¬p,¬s}.
Hence (as s ⊢ p, i.e., ¬p ⊢ ¬s), ¬p′ and ¬s are entailed by {¬p′,¬p}. So, since the set
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{¬p′,¬p} is consistent (as either ¬p′ ⊢ ¬p or ¬p ⊢ ¬p′), the set {¬p′,¬s} is also
consistent. Since p′ and s are not logically independent (by assumption of Case 1), and
since {p′, s} is consistent (by Claim 1.2), {p′,¬s} is consistent (as p′ ∈ Y1) and {¬p
′,¬s}
is consistent (as just shown), it follows that {¬p′, s} is inconsistent, so that s ⊢ p′. This
proves (5).
Note that for every event p′ in X∗+, either p
′ ⊢ s (if p′ ∈ Y1) or s ⊢ p
′ (if Y ∈ Y1, by
(5)). So the augmented (sub-)agenda X∗ ∪ {s,¬s} is nested, a contradiction as X∗ is a
maximal nested subagenda of X. QED
Claim 1.4. Y1, Y2 = ∅.
By Claim 1.3 we may equivalently show that Y1, Y2 = X
∗
+. Suppose for a contradic-
tion that Y1 = X
∗
+ or Y2 = X
∗
+. Then X
∗ ∪ {s,¬s} is a nested agenda, a contradiction
since X∗ was deﬁned as a maximal nested subagenda of X. QED
The proof of condition (c) is completed by combining Claim 1.4 with the following
observation:
Claim 1.5. For all q ∈ Y1 and r ∈ Y2, the set Y := {¬q, r, s} satisﬁes the requirements
of condition (c), i.e., |Y | = 3 and (Y \{p}) ∪ {¬p} is consistent for each p ∈ Y .
Consider any q ∈ Y1 and r ∈ Y2 and let Y := {¬q, r, s}. To see why |Y | = 3, note
that ¬q = r since r ∈ X∗+ while ¬q ∈ X
∗
+, and that s = ¬q, r since ¬q, r ∈ X
∗ while
s ∈ X∗. Further:
• {q, r, s} is consistent, because, ﬁrstly, {q, s} is consistent by Claim 1.2, and, sec-
ondly, q ⊢ r, as q and r belong to the linearly ordered set X∗+ and as r ⊢ q (by the
fact that q ∈ Y1 and r ∈ Y1).
• {¬q,¬r, s} is consistent, because, ﬁrstly, ¬r ⊢ ¬q (since q ⊢ r, as just shown),
and, secondly, ¬r ⊢ s (since r ∈ Y2).
• {¬q, r,¬s} is consistent, because, ﬁrstly, ¬s ⊢ ¬q (since q ⊢ s, as q ∈ Y1), and,
secondly, ¬s ⊢ r (since ¬r ⊢ s, as r ∈ Y2). QED
Case 2 : p, q ∈ X are logically independent, i.e., all of {p, q}, {p,¬q}, {¬p, q} and
{¬p,¬q} are consistent. Consider such p, q ∈ X. Since |X| > 4 there is an r ∈
X\{p,¬p, q,¬q}. As r is non-contradictory, it can be consistently added to at least one
of the (consistent) sets {p, q}, {p,¬q}, {¬p, q} and {¬p,¬q}. We may assume without
loss of generality that {p,¬q, r} is consistent (otherwise, simply interchange p with ¬p
and/or q with ¬q). The argument distinguishes between two subcases.
Subcase 2.1 : {¬p,¬q,¬r} and {p, q,¬r} are both consistent. In this case, condition
(c) holds for Y := {p,¬q,¬r}, since each of the sets {¬p,¬q,¬r}, {p, q,¬r} and {p,¬q, r}
is consistent.
Subcase 2.2 : {¬p,¬q,¬r} or {p, q,¬r} is inconsistent (perhaps both are). We assume
without loss of generality that {p, q,¬r} is inconsistent, i.e., {p, q} ⊢ r. (The proof is
analogous in the other case.) There are three subsubcases.
Subsubcase 2.2.1 : {¬p, q,¬r} and {p,¬q,¬r} are both consistent. Here, condition
(c) holds for Y := {p, q,¬r}, since each of the sets {¬p, q,¬r}, {p,¬q,¬r} and {p, q, r}
is consistent (the latter set being consistent because {p, q} is consistent and entails r).
Subsubcase 2.2.2 : {¬p, q,¬r} is inconsistent. So {¬p, q} ⊢ r. As also {p, q} ⊢ r, we
have q ⊢ r. We once again distinguish between cases:
• First assume {¬p,¬q,¬r} is inconsistent. Then condition (c) holds with Y =
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{¬p,¬q, r}, because {p,¬q, r}, {¬p, q, r} and {¬p,¬q,¬r} are consistent (where
{¬p, q, r} is consistent as {¬p, q} is consistent and q ⊢ r).
• Second assume {¬p,¬q,¬r} is inconsistent, i.e., {¬p,¬q} ⊢ r. Since also q ⊢ r, we
have ¬r ⊢ ¬q, p. Condition (c) holds with Y = {p,¬q, r}, because {¬p,¬q, r} is
consistent (as {¬p,¬q} is consistent and entails r), {p, q, r} is consistent (as {p, q}
is consistent and entails r) and {p,¬q,¬r} is consistent (as ¬r ⊢ ¬q, p).
Subsubcase 2.2.3 : {p,¬q,¬r} is inconsistent. (If in the following proof for the current
subsubcase we interchange p and q, then we obtain an alternative, but longer, proof for
Subsubcase 2.2.2.) Since {p,¬q,¬r} is inconsistent, {p,¬q} ⊢ r. As also {p, q} ⊢ r, it
follows that p ⊢ r. We now show that
(*) {¬p, q, r} and {¬p,¬q,¬r} are consistent
or (**) {¬p,¬q, r} and {¬p, q,¬r} are consistent.
(6)
To show this, we assume that (*) is violated and show that (**) holds, by distinguishing
between two cases:
• First, let {¬p, q, r} be inconsistent. It follows, on the one hand, that {¬p, q,¬r}
is consistent (as {¬p, q} is consistent), and, on the other hand, that {¬p,¬q, r}
is consistent (as otherwise, by the inconsistency of {¬p, q, r}, {¬p, r} would be
inconsistent, i.e., r ⊢ p, a contradiction since p ⊢ r and p = r). This proves (**).
• Second, let {¬p, q, r} be consistent. Then {¬p,¬q,¬r} is inconsistent as (*) is
violated. It follows, one the one hand, that {¬p,¬q, r} is consistent (as {¬p,¬q}
is consistent), and, on the other hand, that {¬p, q,¬r} is consistent (as otherwise
{¬p,¬r} would be inconsistent, i.e., ¬r ⊢ p, a contradiction since p ⊢ r). This
proves (**).
We can now prove condition (c). In the case of (*), (c) holds with Y = {¬p,¬q, r},
since {p,¬q, r} is consistent (as {p,¬q} is consistent and p ⊢ r), {¬p, q, r} is consistent
(by (*)) and {¬p,¬q,¬r} is consistent (by (*)). In the case of (**), (c) holds with
Y = {¬p, q, r}, since {p, q, r} is consistent (as {p, q} is consistent and p ⊢ r), {¬p,¬q, r}
is consistent (by (**)) and {¬p, q,¬r} is consistent (by (**)). 
Drawing on Lemma 3, I next show that for almost every agenda the set of winning
coalitions of a systematic and implicit consensus preserving aggregation rule deﬁnes an
ultraﬁlter (which would not be true if implicit consensus preservation were replaced by
the standard unanimity condition).
Lemma 4 Consider a systematic and implicit consensus preserving aggregation rule
F : J n → J for an agenda X, and coalitions C,C ′ ⊆ N .
(a) If X satisﬁes |J | > 2, then [C ∈ WF and C ⊆ C
′] ⇒ C′ ∈ WF .
(b) If X is non-nested and non-tiny, then C,C′ ∈ WF ⇒ C ∩C
′ ∈ WF .
(c) C ∈ WF ⇔ N\C ∈ WF .
Note that |J | > 2 if and only if X has more than two propositions (one issue),19 a
very mild assumption, satisﬁed notably by non-tiny agendas.
Proof. Let X, F , C and C ′ be as speciﬁed.
19counting only contingent propositions and counting equivalent propositions (if any) only once
19
(a) Suppose |J | > 2, C ∈ WF and C ⊆ C
′. We show that C ′ ∈ WF . As |J | > 2,
there exist contingent and pairwise non-equivalent propositions p,¬p, q,¬q ∈ X. There
must exist a member of {p,¬p} which entails neither q nor ¬q, as can be shown using that
the propositions p,¬p, q,¬q are contingent and pairwise non-equivalent. Without loss
of generality. we assume that p entails neither q nor ¬q (otherwise simply interchange
p and ¬p). So {p, q} and {p,¬q} are each consistent. Note that at least one of {¬p, q}
and {¬p,¬q} is consistent, as ¬p is not a contradiction. Without loss of generality.
we assume the latter (otherwise interchange q and ¬q). To summarize, each of the
sets {p, q}, {p,¬q} and {¬p,¬q} is consistent. We may therefore consider a proﬁle
(J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n such that
Ji ⊇


{p, q} for all i ∈ C,
{p,¬q} for all i ∈ C ′\C,
{¬p,¬q} for all i ∈ N\C′.
First, since each Ji contains p or ¬q, so does F (J1, ..., Jn) by implicit consensus preser-
vation (version 2). Second, q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) since {i ∈ N : q ∈ Ji} = C ∈ WF . These
two facts imply that p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn). So, as {i : p ∈ Ji} = C
′, we have C′ ∈ WF .
(b) Suppose X is non-nested and non-tiny, and assume C,C∗ ∈ WF . We show
that C ∩ C∗ ∈ WF . By assumption on X and Lemma 3, there is a three-element set
Y = {p, q, r} ⊆ X such that each of {¬p, q, r}, {p,¬q, r} and {p, q,¬r} is consistent.
This allows us to construct a proﬁle (J1, ..., Jn) ∈ J
n such that
Ji ⊇


{¬p, q, r} if i ∈ C ∩C∗
{p, q,¬r} if i ∈ C∗\C
{p,¬q, r} if i ∈ N\C∗.
First, q ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) as {i : q ∈ Ji} = C
∗ ∈ WF . Second, as C ∈ WF and C ⊆ C ∪
(N\C∗), we have C∪(N\C∗) ∈ WF by part (a); hence r ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn) as {i : r ∈ Ji} =
C∪(N\C∗). Third, as each Ji contains ¬p or ¬q or ¬r, so does F (J1, ..., Jn) by implicit
consensus preservation (version 2). These three facts imply that ¬p ∈ F (J1, ..., Jn).
Hence, as {i : ¬p ∈ Ji} = C ∩C∗, we have C ∩C∗ ∈ WF .
(c) This claim is obvious, as (by |J | > 1) we can choose a contingent proposition
p ∈ X and construct a proﬁle in J n in which all i ∈ C accept p and all i ∈ N\C accept
¬p. 
I can now prove Theorem 1, whose ‘if’ part will follow from the above lemmas.
Proof of Theorem 1. 1. In this part of the proof, let the agenda X be non-nested and
non-tiny, and let F : J n → J be independent and implicit consensus preserving. I need
to show that F is dictatorial. By Lemma 2, F is systematic. By Lemma 4, the set of
winning coalitions WF is an ultraﬁlter over the set of individuals N . As is well-known,
every ultraﬁlter over a ﬁnite set is principal, i.e., there is an individual j ∈ N such that
WF = {C ⊆ N : j ∈ C}. Clearly, j is a dictator.
2. Conversely, assume the agenda X is nested or tiny. I need to construct a non-
dictatorial rule F : J n → J which is independent and implicit consensus preserving.
As n ≥ 3, we may choose an odd-sized subgroup M ⊆ N containing at least three
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individuals. (For instance M = N if n is odd, or M = {1, 2, 3}.) Deﬁne F as the
aggregation rule on J n given by majority voting among M , i.e.,
F (J1, ..., Jn) = {p ∈ X : |{i ∈M : p ∈ Ji}| > |M | /2} for all J1, ..., Jn ∈ J .
I have to show that F (i) maps into J , (ii) is independent, (iii) is implicit consensus
preserving, and (iv) is not dictatorial. Properties (ii) and (iv) hold obviously; regarding
(ii), F is in fact even systematic, and regarding (iv) it matters that |M | > 1 and
|J | > 1. Properties (i) and (iii) both follow as soon as we have shown version 3 of
implicit consensus preservation. Consider J1, ..., Jn ∈ J . To show that F (J1, ..., Jn) ∈
{J1, ..., Jn}, I distinguish between two cases.
Case 1 : X is nested, i.e., of the form X = {p1, ..., pm}
± where m is the number of
issues and where p1 entails p2, p2 entails p3, etc. Notice that for each J ∈ J there is a
cut-oﬀ level t = tJ ∈ {1, ...,m+ 1} such that J = {¬p1, ...,¬pt−1, pt, ..., pm}, and that
F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji = {¬p1, ...,¬ptJi−1 , ptJi , ..., pm},
where i is the median individual in M , i.e., the (or an) individual i inM such that more
than half of the individuals j in M have a cut-oﬀ level tJj ≤ tJi , and more than half of
the individuals j in M have a cut-oﬀ level tJj ≥ tJi .
Case 2 : X is tiny. As one easily checks, we may assume without loss of generality.
that X is redundancy-free and contains only contingent propositions. Then, as X is
tiny, it is either a one-issue agenda or a two-issue agenda. In the ﬁrst case, F (J1, ..., Jn)
is a singleton {p}, which equals Ji for any individual i accepting p. In the second
case, F (J1, ..., Jn) is a binary set {p, q}; since the subgroups {i ∈ M : p ∈ Ji} and
{i ∈M : q ∈ Ji} each contain a majority of the individuals inM , these subgroups share
at least one individual i, whose judgment set is therefore Ji = {p, q} = F (J1, ..., Jn). 
A.2 Results of Section 5: the scope of an agenda
I prove these results in a slightly diﬀerent order, and draw on additional lemmas.
Proof of Remark 1. The conjunction (disjunction) of elements p, q of a redundancy-
free agenda X is unique because any two conjunctions (disjunctions) of p and q entail
each other, hence coincide as X is redundancy-free. The simple argument is spelled out
in more detail in the proof of Remark 3. 
Proof of Remark 2. Suppose an agenda X is closed under conjunction. Let p, q ∈ X.
Let r ∈ X be the (possibly not unique) conjunction of ¬p and ¬q. Then ¬r is the
(possibly not unique) disjunction of p and q. Indeed, any J ∈ J contains p or q if and
only if it is not the case that ¬p,¬q ∈ J ; which is equivalent to r ∈ J , i.e., to ¬r ∈ J .
Analogously, one can show that if X is closed under disjunction then any p, q ∈ X have
a conjunction in X, namely the proposition ¬r where r is a disjunction of ¬p and ¬q.

Lemma 5 The notions of consistency, entailment, conjunction and disjunction are pre-
served by any extension of the agenda (and thus can be used without referring explicitly
to an agenda). Formally, for any agenda X and any superagenda X ′ (e.g., the scope of
X),
21
(a) a set S ⊆ X is consistent w.r.t. X if and only if it is so w.r.t. X ′,
(b) a proposition p ∈ X (or set S ⊆ X) entails a proposition p′ ∈ X (or set S′ ⊆ X)
w.r.t. X if and only if it does so w.r.t. X ′,
(c) a proposition r ∈ X is the (or a) conjunction/disjunction of certain propositions
in X w.r.t. X if and only if it is so w.r.t. X ′.
Proof. Part (b) follows from part (a), since the entailment notion is reducible to
the consistency notion (e.g., p entails p′ if and only if {p,¬p′} is inconsistent). Further,
part (c) follows from part (b), since the notions of conjunction and disjunction are
reducible to the entailment notion: r is a conjunction of a set of propositions S if and
only if r and S entail each other, and r is a disjunction of the set of propositions S if
and only if ¬r and {¬p : p ∈ S} entail each other. To prove part (a), recall that (*)
JX = {J
′ ∩X : J ′ ∈ JX ′}. Consider any S ⊆ X. First, let S be consistent w.r.t. X.
Then there is a J ∈ JX such that S ⊆ J . By (*), we may write J = J
′ ∩X for some
J ′ ∈ JX′ . Clearly, S ⊆ J
′, whence S is consistent w.r.t. X ′. Conversely, assume S is
consistent w.r.t. X ′. Then we may choose a J ′ ∈ JX′ such that S ⊆ J
′. By (*), JX
contains J := J ′ ∩X. Note that S ⊆ J . So S is consistent w.r.t. X. 
Proof or Remark 3. Let X be a closed redundancy-free agenda and ⊢ the relation
of entailment between propositions. The proof proceeds in four claims.
Claim 1 : (X,⊢) is a lattice whose meet and join are given by the operations of
conjunction ∧ and disjunction ∨, respectively.
First, ⊢ is a partial order: it is clearly reﬂexive and transitive, and it is also anti-
symmetric as X is redundancy-free. Next, for any p, q ∈ X, the conjunction p∧ q is the
greatest lower bound of p and q because, ﬁrstly, it is a lower bound (i.e., p ∧ q ⊢ p, q),
and, secondly, if r is also a lower bound, then r ⊢ p ∧ q, as r ⊢ p, q and {p, q} ⊢ p ∧ q.
Analogously, for any p ∈ X, the disjunction p ∨ q is the smallest upper bound of p and
q. QED
Claim 2 : The lattice (X,⊢) is distributive.
Let p, q, r ∈ X. Since p ⊢ p∨q and p ⊢ p∨r, we have (*) p ⊢ (p∨q)∧(p∨r). Since q∧r
entails q (which entails p∨q) and entails r (which entails p∨r), (**) q∧r ⊢ (p∨q)∧(p∨r).
By (*) and (**),
p ∨ (q ∧ r) ⊢ (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r). (7)
We next show the converse implication,
(p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r) ⊢ p ∨ (q ∧ r). (8)
Consider any J ∈ J containing (p∨ q)∧ (p∨ r), and let us show that p∨ (q∧ r) ∈ J . As
(p∨q)∧(p∨r) entails p∨q and also p∨r, we have p∨q, p∨r ∈ J . So, J contains p or q (or
both), and contains p or r (or both). So, J contains p or contains both q and r; in the
latter case, q∧r ∈ J . Since, as we have shown, p ∈ J or q∧r ∈ J , we have p∨(q∧r) ∈ J ,
as desired. By (7) and (8), and by the asymmetry of ⊢, p ∨ (q ∧ r) = (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r).
By analogous arguments, p ∧ (q ∨ r) = (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r). QED
Claim 3 : X has a smallest element ⊥ and a greatest element ⊺, namely the contra-
diction ∧p∈Xp and the tautology ∨p∈Xp, respectively.
It is obvious that ∧p∈Xp entails each q ∈ X and that each q ∈ X entails ∨p∈Xp.
QED
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Claim 4 : For each p ∈ X, p ∧ ¬p = ⊥ and p ∨ ¬p = ⊺ (i.e., ¬p is the algebraic
complement of p).
Let p ∈ X. Since {p,¬p} is inconsistent, p ∧ ¬p = ⊥. Since every J ∈ J contains p
or ¬p, every J ∈ J contains p ∨ ¬p, whence p ∨ ¬p = ⊺. 
Lemma 6 For any agenda X and any closed (redundancy-free) superagenda X ′ — pos-
sible X itself or the scope of X — a set A ⊆ X is consistent if and only if, in X ′,
∧p∈Ap = ⊥.
Proof. Let X and X ′ be as speciﬁed. By Lemma 5, we need not distinguish between
consistency w.r.t. X and w.r.t. X ′. We proceed by showing three claims.
Claim 1 : ⊥ is the only element ofX ′ which is not contained in any rational judgment
set J ∈ JX′ .
This follows from four facts (some of which draw on Remark 3): (i) ⊥ is the only
element of X ′ which entails its own algebraic complement (a basic fact about Boolean
algebras); (ii) the algebraic complement of an element p is its (agenda-theoretic) nega-
tion ¬p; (iii) an element p entails another q if and only if no J ∈ JX′ contains both
p and ¬q; (iv) every J ∈ JX′ contains exactly one of member of each pair p,¬p ∈ X.
QED
Claim 2 : For any J ∈ JX′ and any A ⊆ J , we have ∧p∈Ap ∈ J .
Let J ∈ JX′ and A ⊆ J . By Remark 3 we can think of ‘∧’ alternatively as
the conjunction operator (deﬁned agenda-theoretically) or the meet (deﬁned Boolean-
algebraically). The claim holds by induction on the size of A. If A = ∅, the claims
holds because then ∧p∈Ap = ⊺ and ⊺ ∈ J (as ⊺ = ¬ ⊥, where ⊥ ∈ J by Claim 1). Now
assume A has size m ≥ 1 and suppose the claim holds for any smaller size. We may
write A = A′ ∪{q} with q ∈ A′. By induction hypothesis, ∧p∈A′p ∈ J . Since J contains
both ∧p∈A′p and q, J contains their conjunction (∧p∈A′p) ∧ q = ∧p∈Ap by deﬁnition of
conjunction. QED
Claim 3 : A set A ⊆ X ′ is consistent if and only if ∧p∈Ap = ⊥.
First, let A ⊆ X ′ be consistent. Then it has an extension J ∈ JX ′ , which by Claim
2 contains ∧p∈Ap. So by Claim 1 ∧p∈Ap = ⊥. Conversely, assume ∧p∈Ap = ⊥. Then
by Claim 1 there is a J ∈ JX′ containing ∧p∈Ap. So, as ∧p∈Ap entails each p ∈ A, J
contains each p ∈ A, i.e., A ⊆ J . 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let X be an agenda. As one easily checks, we may assume
without loss of generality. that X is redundancy-free.
1. In this part we show that we may assume without loss of generality. that X is
a ‘semantic’ agenda given as follows: there exists a ﬁnite set of ‘worlds’ Ω = ∅ such
that X ⊆ 2Ω, where (i) each issue takes the form {A,A} (I write A for the complement
Ω\A of any set A ⊆ Ω), (ii) the set JX of rational judgment sets consists of those
sets J ⊆ X which contain exactly one member of each issue and satisfy ∩A∈JA = ∅,
and (iii) rational judgment sets in JX correspond to worlds in Ω, in the sense that the
assignment J → ∩A∈JA deﬁnes a bijection from JX to {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}.
To show this, we consider any agenda V and construct a semantic agenda X of the
given sort to which V is isomorphic. Let the set of worlds be Ω := JV . To each p ∈ V
corresponds a set of worlds, the ‘extension’ of p, given by [p] := {ω ∈ Ω : p ∈ ω}. Note
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that the assignment p → [p] deﬁnes a bijection from V to the set X := {[p] : p ∈ V }. I
deﬁne an agenda by the set X, endowed with
• issues deﬁned as the sets {[p], [¬p]} (which indeed partition X into pairs, since the
sets {p,¬p} partition V into pairs and since p → [p] maps V bijectively to X),
• rational judgment sets deﬁned as the sets J ⊆ X containing exactly one member
of each issue and satisfying ∩A∈JA = ∅.
This agendaX satisﬁes (i) since [¬p] = [p] for all p ∈ V , and satisﬁes (ii) immediately
by deﬁnition. To show that it satisﬁes (iii), we ﬁrst show that for each J ∈ JX the
intersection ∩A∈JA (= ∅) is indeed a singleton. Assume for a condition that it contains
distinct ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. Since ω = ω′, there is a p ∈ V such that p ∈ ω′\ω and ¬p ∈ ω\ω′.
So, ω ∈ [p] and ω′ ∈ [¬p]. Since J contains either [p] or [¬p], it follows that either
ω ∈ ∩A∈JA or ω
′ ∈ ∩A∈JA, a contradiction. Second, one has to check injectivity and
surjectivity of the mapping from JX to {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}; we leave this to the reader.
Finally, to show that V and X are isomorphic (as agendas), it suﬃces to show
that p → [p] deﬁnes an (agenda) isomorphism. This is so because the assignment
p → [p] is bijective, and bijectively maps the issues {p,¬p} of V to those of X, and the
rational judgment sets of V to those of X (the latter can be shown by verifying that
the assignment J → {[p] : p ∈ J} deﬁnes a bijection from JV to JX).
2. From now on we assume that X takes the semantic form deﬁned in part 1. In
the current part, we show the existence claim. As one can check, X is a subagenda of
the agenda X ′ := 2Ω whose issues are the pairs {A,A} (A ⊆ Ω) and whose rational
judgment sets are the sets of the form {A ⊆ Ω : ω ∈ A} (ω ∈ Ω). It suﬃces to show
that X ′ is a minimal closed extension of X. First, X ′ is closed, where the conjunction
is given by the intersection, and the disjunction by the union. Second, we have to show
minimality. Consider any superagenda X ′′ of X which is a strict subagenda of X ′.
We have to show that X ′′ is not closed. As X ′′ is a subagenda of X ′, it inherits its
issues from X ′, and thus X ′′ is closed under complement: A ∈ X ′′ ⇒ A ∈ X ′′. Since
X ′ (= 2Ω) is the only subset of 2Ω which includes X and is closed under intersection
and complement, and since X ′′ is closed under complement, X ′′ cannot be closed under
intersection. It follows that X ′′ is not closed (i.e., not closed under conjunction), by
the following argument. Choose any A,B ∈ X ′′ such that A ∩ B ∈ X ′′. Suppose for
a contradiction that X ′′ contains a C which (relative to agenda X ′′) is the conjunction
of A and B, i.e., is equivalent to {A,B}. Sine A ∩ B ∈ X ′′, C = A ∩ B. So, since
also C ⊆ A and C ⊆ B (as C entails A and B relative to the agenda X ′′), we have
C  A ∩B. Choose any ω ∈ (A ∩B)\C. Note that J ′′ := {D ∈ X ′′ : ω ∈ D} belongs
to JX′′ , and contains A and B but not C. So (still relative to agenda X
′′) {A,B} does
not entail C, a contradiction since C is the conjunction of A and B.
3. Finally, we show the uniqueness claim. Since the agenda X ′ deﬁned in part 2 is
a minimal closed extension of X, it suﬃces to show that any other such extension of X
is equal to X ′ up to relabelling. Let Z be an arbitrary minimal closed superagenda of
X. We need to deﬁne an agenda isomorphism f : X ′ → Z which is constant on X. For
all ω ∈ Ω and all Y ⊆ X ′ (= 2Ω), let Yω := {A ∈ Y : ω ∈ A}, and for all B ∈ X ′ (= 2Ω)
let
pB := ∨ω∈B (∧Xω) ( ∈ Z). (9)
Here and in what follows, let ‘∨’, ‘∧’ and ‘¬’ refer to the disjunction, conjunction and
negation operators of Z (rather than of X or X ′). By Remark 3, ‘∨’, ‘∧’ and ‘¬’ can
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alternatively be viewed as the algebraic operations of join, meet and complement in the
Boolean algebra Z. So, standard algebraic rules apply, such as associativity, commu-
tativity and distributivity of ∨ and ∧. Also, let ⊺ and ⊥ be the greatest and smallest
elements of the Boolean algebra Z, respectively; clearly, ⊺ is the (only) tautology and
⊥ the (only) contradiction of the agenda Z.
Claim 1 : For all Y ⊆ X, A ∈ X\Y and ω ∈ Ω we write Y Aω := Yω ∪ {A}. For
every subagenda Y of X, A ∈ X\Y , and ω ∈ A, either ∧Y Aω = ⊥ or Y
A
ω = Y
A
ω′ for some
ω′ ∈ A.
Consider any subagenda Y of X, A ∈ X\Y , and ω ∈ A. First assume Y Aω is
inconsistent w.r.t. agenda X. Then ∧Y Aω = ⊥ by Lemma 6. Now assume Y
A
ω is
consistent w.r.t. agenda X. So there is an ω′ ∈ ∩Y Aω . In particular, ω
′ ∈ ∩Yω. So,
for each B ∈ Y , ω ∈ B ⇒ ω′ ∈ B. In fact, the ‘ ⇒’ can be replaced by ‘⇔’, since
ω and ω′ belong to the same number of sets B in Y (i.e., to half the these sets, as
B ∈ Y ⇔ B ∈ Y ). So, Yω = Yω′ , and hence, Y
A
ω = Y
A
ω′ . QED
Claim 2 : For all B ∈ X ′, ¬pB = pB.
Let B ∈ X ′. Since ¬ coincides with the algebraic complement operation in Z, it
suﬃces to show that pB ∨ pB = ⊺ and pB ∧ pB = ⊥.
We ﬁrst prove that pB ∨ pB = ⊺. Since
pB ∨ pB = [∨ω∈B ∧Xω] ∨

∨ω∈B ∧Xω

= ∨ω∈Ω ∧Xω,
we have to prove that ∨ω∈Ω ∧Xω = ⊺. We ﬁrst show that
∨ω∈Ω ∧Xω = ∨ω∈Ω ∧ Yω, (10)
where Y is any set of the form X\{A,A} with A ∈ X. Note that
∨ω∈Ω ∧Xω = [∨ω∈A ∧Xω] ∨

∨ω∈A ∧Xω

=

∨ω∈A ∧ Y
A
ω

∨

∨ω∈A ∧ Y
A
ω

,
where the last expression uses notation introduced in Claim 1. This expression is a
disjunction of terms (disjuncts) of two types: any ∧Y Aω with ω ∈ A (type 1) and any
∧Y Aω with ω ∈ A (type 2). The result is not aﬀected by adding the following new
disjuncts: any ∧Y Aω with ω ∈ A (type 3) and any ∧Y
A
ω with ω ∈ A (type 4). Indeed, by
Claim 1 each new disjunct of type 3 is either ⊥ or coincides with a disjunct of type 1,
and any new disjunct of type 4 is either ⊥ or coincides with a disjunct of type 2. After
adding these new disjuncts and re-grouping, the expression becomes

∨ω∈Ω ∧ Y
A
ω

∨

∨ω∈Ω ∧ Y
A
ω

.
Noting that each Y Aω equals {A} ∪ Yω and each Y
A
ω equals {A} ∪ Yω, and then using
distributivity twice, the last expression reduces to
[A ∧ (∨ω∈Ω ∧ Yω)] ∨

A ∧ (∨ω∈Ω ∧ Yω)

=

A ∨A

∧ (∨ω∈Ω ∧ Yω) = ∨ω∈Ω ∧ Yω.
This proves (10). By an analogous argument, one can show that (unless Y = ∅), we
have ∨ω∈Ω ∧ Yω = ∨ω∈Ω ∧ Y
′
ω for a set Y
′ of the form Y \{A,A} with A ∈ Y ; which
together with (10) yields that ∨ω∈Ω ∧Xω = ∨ω∈Ω ∧ Y
′
ω. Continuing in this fashion, we
ultimately obtain that ∨ω∈Ω ∧Xω = ∨ω∈Ω ∧∅ω = ⊺, as desired.
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We ﬁnally have to prove that pB ∧ pB = ⊥. Using distributivity twice,
pB ∧ pB = [∨ω∈B ∧Xω] ∧

∨ω′∈B ∧Xω′

= ∨ω∈B

[∧Xω] ∧

∨ω′∈B ∧Xω′
	
= ∨ω∈B

∨ω′∈B ([∧Xω] ∧ [∧Xω′ ])
	
.
It thus suﬃces to show that for all ω ∈ B and ω ∈ B we have [∧Xω]∧ [∧Xω′ ] = ⊥. Let
ω ∈ B and ω ∈ B. Since ω = ω′, there is an A ∈ X such that ω ∈ A and ω′ ∈ A. Since
A ∈ Xω, ∧Xω entails A. Analogously, since A ∈ Xω′ , ∧Xω′ entails A. It follows that
[∧Xω] ∧ [∧Xω′ ] entails A ∧ A. As A ∧ A = ⊥ (since A and A are complements in the
algebra Z), it follows that [∧Xω] ∧ [∧Xω′ ] entails ⊥, hence, equals ⊥. QED
Claim 3 : pB = B for all B ∈ X.
Consider any B ∈ X. We regard B as an element of the extended agenda Z ⊇ X.
Since Z is redundancy-free, it suﬃces to show that pB and B entail each other. We ﬁrst
show that pB entails B. Since pB is the least upper bound of all ∧Xω with ω ∈ B, it
suﬃces to show that B is an upper bound, i.e., that each of these ∧Xω entails B. This
is so because for each ω ∈ B the set Xω contains B. Second, we show that B entails pB,
or equivalently, that ¬pB entails ¬B. This follows from the previous argument applied
to B rather than B, because ¬pB = pB by Claim 2 and because ¬B = B (as Z is a
superagenda of X, so that B’s Z-relative negation ¬pB coincides with B’s X-relative
negation B). QED
Claim 4 : Z = {pB : B ∈ X
′}.
The set S := {pB : B ∈ X
′} (⊆ Z) is closed under negation by Claim 2, hence deﬁnes
a subagenda of Z. The agenda S is closed because for any B,C ∈ X ′ the disjunction
of pB and pC (relative to the agenda Z) equals pB∪C , hence belongs to the agenda S
(relative to which it of course still deﬁnes the disjunction of pB and pC). Moreover, the
agenda S includes X by Claim 3, hence is a superagenda of X. Since Z is by deﬁnition
a minimal closed superagenda of X, it follows that S = Z. QED
Claim 5 : For all A,B ∈ X ′, A ⊆ B if and only if pA entails pB.
For each ω ∈ Ω we have p{ω} = ⊥; this is because the set Xω is consistent with
respect to agenda X, and hence p{ω} = ∧Xω = ⊥ by Lemma 6. Now consider any
A,B ∈ X ′. First, if A ⊆ B, then pA clearly entails pB since pB is a disjunction of at
least those terms of which pA is a disjunction. Conversely, now assume that pA entails
pB. As A\B ⊆ B, pA\B entails pB; and so, as pB = ¬pB by Claim 2, pA\B entails ¬pB.
Also, as A\B ⊆ A, pA\B entails pA; and so, as pA entails pB, pA\B entails pB. Since, as
we have shown, pA\B entails both ¬pB and pB, it entails ¬pB ∧pB = ⊥. Hence, pA\B =
⊥. It follows that A\B = ∅, i.e., A ⊆ B, since if there were an ω ∈ A\B, then p{ω}
would entail pA\B, whence p{ω} = ⊥, in contradiction with what was shown at the start
of the proof of the claim. QED
Claim 6 : For all A,B ∈ X ′, pA∪B = pA ∨ pB and pA∩B = pA ∧ pB.
Let A,B ∈ X ′. The ﬁrst identity holds immediately by deﬁnition of pA and pB. As
for the second identity, using de Morgan’s Law (valid in Boolean algebras) and then
Claim 2, pA ∧ pB = ¬(¬pA ∨¬pB) = ¬(pA ∨ pB). Now using the ﬁrst identity, it follows
that pA∧B = ¬pA∪B, which reduces to pA∩B by A ∪B = A ∩B and Claim 2. QED
Claim 7 : The assignment B → pB deﬁnes an agenda isomorphism between X
′ and
Z which is constant on X. (This completes the proof.)
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This assignment — call it f — is constant on X by Claim 3, and surjective by Claim
4. To show injectivity, consider distinct A,B ∈ X ′. We may assume without loss of
generality. that A ⊆ B (since otherwise the roles of A and B can be interchanged). By
Claim 5, pA does not entail pB, and so pA = pB. It remains to show that f preserves the
agenda structure: the issues (resp. negation operator) and the interconnections. This
could be deduced from Claim 5 since, ﬁrstly, by Claim 5 the (bijective) function f is a
Boolean-algebra isomorphism, and, secondly, for a closed agenda, the agenda structure
and the Boolean-algebra structure are interdeﬁnable, as can be veriﬁed.20 But let me
give a direct proof. First, f preserves the issues structure, since for each A ∈ X ′ we
have ¬pA = pA and A is the X
′-relative negation of A. Second, consider a set S ⊆ X ′;
we show that S is consistent (in the sense of X ′) if and only if its image {pB : B ∈ S}
is consistent (in the sense of Z). This holds for the following reasons. S is consistent
if and only if ∩S = ∅, which is in turn equivalent to p∩S = p∅, i.e., to p∩S = ⊥. By
Claim 6, the latter is equivalent to ∧B∈SpB = ⊥, which is in turn equivalent to the
consistency of {pB : B ∈ S} by Lemma 6. 
Proof of Lemma 1. This lemma follows from the proof of Proposition 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let X be an agenda. It suﬃces to show that for each J ∈ JX
and p ∈ X, J entails p or entails ¬p, or equivalently, ∧q∈Jq entails p or entails ¬p. This
follows from the fact that, by Lemma 1, ∧q∈Jq is an atom of X, i.e., a logically strongest
element of X\{⊥}. 
A.3 Results of Section 6: agenda manipulation
Proof of Theorem 2. We consider any aggregation system (FX)X∈X .
1. First, suppose (FX)X∈X is agenda-invariant.
Claim 1: (FX)X∈X is coherent.
Consider X,X ′ ∈ X with X ⊆ X ′ and J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX . Each Ji is consistent, and
thus extendible to a J ′i ∈ JX ′ . I show that FX(J1, ..., Jn) ⊆ FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n). Consider
any p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn). Applying agenda-invariance to the agendas X and X
′, the
proposition p (∈ X = X ∩X ′) and the judgment sets J ′i (∈ JX′ = JX∪X′), and noting
that each J ′i satisﬁes J
′
i ∩X = Ji and J
′
i ∩X
′ = J ′i , we obtain that
p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn)⇔ p ∈ FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n).
So, as p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn) by assumption, p ∈ FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n). QED
Claim 2: Each FX is independent.
Consider any X ∈ X , p ∈ X, and (J1, ..., Jn), (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∈ J
n
X such that, for all i,
p ∈ Ji ⇔ p ∈ J ′i . Deﬁne Z as the agenda {p,¬p} ∈ X . For each i, let Ki be {p} if p ∈ Ji
(or equivalently, p ∈ J ′i), and as {¬p} otherwise. Applying agenda-invariance to the
agendas X,Z and the judgment sets Ji (∈ JX = JX∪X ′), and noting that Ji ∩X = Ji
and Ji ∩ Z = Ki, we obtain
p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn)⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (11)
20For instance, a subset A is consistent in the agenda sense if and only if its algebraic meet is not ⊥,
by Lemma 6.
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Applying agenda-invariance again, this time to the agendas X,Z and the judgment sets
J ′i (∈ JX = JX∪Z), and noting that J
′
i ∩X = J
′
i and L
′
i ∩ Z = Ki, we obtain
p ∈ FX(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n)⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (12)
By (11) and (12), p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn)⇔ p ∈ FZ(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n). QED
2. Now suppose (FX)X∈X is coherent and each FX is independent. I prove agenda-
invariance. Consider any X,X ′ ∈ X , p ∈ X∩X ′ and J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX∪X ′ , and let us show
that p ∈ FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) if and only if p ∈ FX′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X ′). Consider
the agenda Z := {p,¬p} ∈ X , and for each i let Ki be {p} if p ∈ Ji and {¬p} otherwise.
Note that p ∈ Ki is equivalent to p ∈ Ji ∩X and also to p ∈ Ji ∩X ′, because each of
these three statements is equivalent to p ∈ Ji. By coherence applied to the agendas Z
and X, the judgment sets K1, ...,Kn ∈ JZ have extensions L1 ⊇ K1, ..., Ln ⊇ Kn in JX
such that FZ(K1, ...,Kn) ⊆ FX(L1, ..., Ln). It follows that
p ∈ FX(L1, ..., Ln)⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (13)
Further, for any i, p ∈ Li is equivalent to p ∈ Ki (as Li ⊇ Ki), which is in turn equivalent
to p ∈ Ji ∩X (as shown above). Hence, as FX is independent, p ∈ FX(L1, ..., Ln) ⇔
p ∈ FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X). By (13) it follows that
p ∈ FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X)⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (14)
By a similar argument for the agenda X ′,
p ∈ FX′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′)⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (15)
By (14) and (15), p ∈ FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X)⇔ p ∈ FX′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X ′). 
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (FX)X∈X be any aggregation system.
1. First let (FX)X∈X be fully agenda-invariant.
Claim 1: (FX)X∈X is fully coherent.
Consider X,X ′ ∈ X with X ⊆ X ′ and J1, ..., Jn in JX . For any individual i, since
Ji is consistent, it is extendible to a 
Ji ∈ JX∪X′ ; we let J ′i := 
Ji ∩ X ′ (∈ JX′). We
have to show that (i) each J ′i entails Ji, and (ii) FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails FX(J1, ..., Jn).
Regarding (i), for any i, as J ′i ∈ JX′ and X ⊆ X
′, the set J ′i entails exactly one set in
JX ; so, by the consistency of J
′
i ∪ Ji (=

Ji), J ′i entails Ji. Regarding (ii), consider any
p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn) and let us show that FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails p. Applying full agenda-
invariance to the agendas X,X ′, the proposition p (∈ X = X ∩ X ′) and the sets 
Ji
(which satisfy 
Ji ∩X = Ji and 
Ji ∩X ′ = J ′i), we obtain
FX(J1, ..., Jn) entails p⇔ FX′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails p.
The left-hand side holds as p ∈ FX(J1, ..., Jn). So, FX ′(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails p. QED
Claim 2: Each FX is independent on X.
Consider any X ∈ X , any p ∈ X, and any (J1, ..., Jn), (J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) ∈ JX such that,
for all i, Ji entails p if and only if J
′
i does so. Let Z be the agenda {p,¬p} ∈ X . For
each i, I deﬁne Ki as {p} if Ji (or equivalently J
′
i) entails p, and as {¬p} otherwise,
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and I deﬁne Li := Ji ∪Ki and L
′
i := J
′
i ∪Ki. Applying full agenda-invariance to the
agendas X,Z and the judgment sets Li (which belong to JX∪Z and satisfy Li ∩X = Ji
and Li ∩ Z = Ki), we obtain
FX(J1, ..., Jn) entails p⇔ FZ(K1, ...,Kn) entails p. (16)
Now applying full agenda-invariance to the agendas X,Z and the judgment sets L′i
(which belong to JX∪Z and satisfy L
′
i ∩X = J
′
i and L
′
i ∩ Z = Ki), we obtain
FX(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails p⇔ FZ(K1, ...,Kn) entails p. (17)
The relations (16) and (17) jointly imply that FX(J1, ..., Jn) entails p if and only if
FZ(J
′
1, ..., J
′
n) entails p. QED
2. Conversely, assume that (FX)X∈X is fully coherent and each FX is independent
on the scope X. To show full agenda-invariance, we consider any X,X ′ ∈ X , p ∈ X∩X ′
and J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX∪X′ , and show that FX(J1 ∩ X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p if and only if
FX ′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′) entails p. Consider the agenda Z := {p,¬p} ∈ X . For each i,
deﬁne Ki as {p} if Ji entails p and {¬p} otherwise. By construction, Ji entails Ki. So,
Ji ∩X also entails Ki (as Ji ∩X ∈ JX and p ∈ X), and so Ji ∩X entails p if and only
if p ∈ Ki. For analogous reasons, Ji ∩X ′ entails Ki, and so Ji ∩X ′ entails p if and only
if p ∈ Ki. By full coherence applied to the agendas Z,X (which indeed satisfy Z ⊆ X
as p ∈ X) and the judgment sets Ki ∈ JZ , there exist some L1, ..., Ln ∈ JX such that
each Li entails Ki and FX(L1, ..., Ln) entails FZ(K1, ...,Kn). As FX(L1, ..., Ln) entails
FZ(K1, ...,Kn) (and as FZ(K1, ...,Kn) is {p} or {¬p}),
FX(L1, ..., Ln) entails p⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (18)
Similarly, for any i, as Li entails Ki (and as Ki is {p} or {¬p}), Li entails p if and
only if p ∈ Ki, which was shown to hold if and only if Ji ∩X entails p. So, as FX is
independent on X, FX(L1, ..., Ln) entails p if and only if FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails
p. By (18) it follows that
FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (19)
By an analogous argument for the agenda X ′,
FX ′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′) entails p⇔ p ∈ FZ(K1, ...,Kn). (20)
The relations (19) and (20) imply that FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p if and only if
FX ′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′) entails p. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let (FX)X∈X be a fully agenda-invariant aggregation system,
and consider an X ∈ X such that X ⊆ ∪Z∈X :|JZ |>2Z. If |JX | > 2, then by Theorem
3 FX is independent on X, whence by Proposition 5 dictatorial or constant. Now
suppose |JX | ≤ 2, i.e., |JX | = 2. So X contains only one pair p,¬p of contingent
propositions (given that X is redundancy-free because L is redundancy-free). Since
X ⊆ ∪Z∈X :|JZ |>2Z, we may choose a Z ∈ X such that |JZ | > 2 and Z contains p (and
thus ¬p). So, since p and ¬p are the only (contingent) propositions in X, X ⊆ Z. By
Theorem 3, FZ is independent on Z, hence dictatorial or constant by Proposition 5. By
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full coherence and the fact that X ⊆ Z, the rule FX inherits from FZ the property of
being dictatorial or constant. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Consider an aggregation system (FX)X∈X .
1. First let this system be conditionally agenda-invariant with each FX setwise
unanimity-preserving. Fix anyX ∈ X . Let p ∈ X be entailed by each of J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX .
We have to show that FX(J1, ..., Jn) entails p. Consider the agenda X
′ := {p,¬p} ∈ X .
Applying conditional agenda-invariance to the judgment sets J ′i := Ji ∪ {p} ∈ JX∪X′
(each of which entails p ∈ X ∩X ′) and noting that each J ′i satisﬁes J
′
i ∩X = Ji and
J ′i ∩X
′ = {p}, we obtain that
FX(J1, ..., Jn) entails p⇔ FX′({p}, ..., {p}) entails p.
The right-hand side (in which ‘entails’ can be replaced by ‘contains’) holds since FX′ is
setwise unanimity-preserving. So the left-hand side holds, as desired.
2. Conversely, assume each FX is implicit consensus preserving (and thus also setwise
unanimity-preserving). To show conditional agenda-invariance, we consider anyX,X ′ ∈
X and p ∈ X ∩X ′, and any J1, ..., Jn ∈ JX∪X ′ each of which entails p. We assume that
FX ′(J1 ∩X
′, ..., Jn ∩X
′) entails p and show that FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p (the
converse implication being analogous). Fix an individual i. Since Ji is consistent and
entails p, Ji is consistent with p. So Ji∩X is also consistent with p, and therefore cannot
entail ¬p. Now, as p ∈ X, every judgment set in JX (such as Ji ∩ X) entails either
p or ¬p. So Ji ∩X entails p. As this is true for all i and as FX is implicit consensus
preserving, FX(J1 ∩X, ..., Jn ∩X) entails p. 
30
